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Une analyse de la polarisation des revenus en Chine rurale et urbaine 
Résumé 
Cet  article  contribue  à  l’étude  de  l’inégalité  de  revenu  en  Chine  en  analysant  plus 
spécifiquement  la  polarisation  des  revenus  qui  capture  simultanément  l’aliénation  (i.e. 
l’hétérogénéité entre les groupes) et l’identification (i.e. l’homogénéité au sein des groupes). 
Les investigations empiriques mises en œuvre reposent sur les données China Health and 
Nutrition Survey de 1989 à 2006 et montrent que le revenu des ménages est fortement 
polarisé. Après une période de stagnation entre 1989 et 1997, le degré de polarisation s’est 
sensiblement accru entre 1997 et 2006, traduisant la constitution de groupes identifiés dans 
les classes de revenu intermédiaires et supérieures. Alors que le niveau de polarisation est 
plus élevé en milieu rural, l’accroissement de la polarisation est nettement plus prononcé 
dans les villes et suggère que le risque de tensions sociales est plus prégnant dans les villes 
chinoises. L’analyse des sources de la polarisation en milieu rural montre que l’accroissement 
de la polarisation est étroitement lié aux opportunités dans le secteur non agricole. Dans les 
zones  urbaines,  l’émergence  de  groupes  identifiés  dans  les  tranches  intermédiaires  et 
supérieures  de  la  distribution  du  revenu  peut  s’expliquer  à  la  fois  par  le  déclin  des 
subventions et par la libéralisation du marché du travail et des entreprises d’Etat. 
Mots-clés : inégalité, polarisation, estimation de densité par la méthode du noyau, Chine 
 
An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the analysis of Chinese income inequality by 
focusing  more  specifically  on  income  polarization,  which  captures  both  alienation  (i.e. 
heterogeneity between income groups) and identification (i.e. homogeneity within groups). 
The  empirical  investigations  conducted  as  part  of  this  research  are  based  on  the  China 
Health and Nutrition Survey data from 1989 to 2006 and indicate that Chinese household 
income  is  strongly  polarized.  After  a  period  of  stagnation  between  1989  and  1997,  the 
degree  of  polarization  increased  significantly  between  1997  and  2006,  indicating  the 
constitution of identified groups in middle and upper income ranges. Although the level of 
income  polarization  is  higher  in  rural  areas,  the  increase  in  polarization  is  far  more 
conspicuous in urban areas, suggesting that the risk of social tensions is more pregnant in 
Chinese cities. The analysis of the sources of income polarization in rural areas shows that 
the increase in polarization is closely linked to non agricultural opportunities. In urban areas, 
the emergence of identified groups in middle and upper income classes can be explained 
both by the sharp decline in subsidies and by the liberalization of the urban labor market and 
state enterprises. 
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While there is an extensive literature on income disparities in China using provincial panel 
data,
1 studies based on household level data are less common. As explained by Benjamin et al. 
(2005a), these studies tend to examine two main issues: (i) the estimation of the level and evolution 
of  inequality  in  rural  and  urban  areas  and  (ii)  the  identification  of  the  socioeconomic  factors 
governing these trends. First, although microeconomic studies on income inequality are based on a 
range of household level data sources and produce results that are not fully comparable, there is a 
rough consensus concerning the continuous increase in inequality since the late 1970s. Furthermore, 
this increase has concerned both rural areas (Bramall, 2001; Benjamin et al., 2005a, 2005b; Wan and 
Zhou,  2005)  and  urban  areas  (Bramall,  2001;  Benjamin  et  al.,  2005a;  Démurger  et  al.,  2006). 
However, depending on the data used, some studies have qualified this trend when examining the 
1990s (Khan and Riskin, 2005; Démurger et al., 2006; Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Gao and Riskin, 
2009). For instance, Khan and Riskin (2005) showed that between 1995 and 2002, income inequality 
declined significantly in rural areas and only slightly in cities. However, when examining the most 
recent period (from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s), the increase in income inequality is clearly 
more pronounced (Chen and Zhang, 2009). The second point of interest of the literature examining 
income inequality in China is the identification of socioeconomic factors that account for the increase 
in inequality. In this perspective, a number of microeconomic studies have analyzed the contribution 
of various income sources to overall inequality. Studies focusing on rural areas have highlighted the 
crucial contribution of non agricultural income to the increase in inequality (Hare, 1994; Khan and 
Riskin, 1998; Tsui, 1998; Benjamin et al., 2005b; Gao and Riskin, 2009; Zhou, 2009). More precisely, 
the decline in agricultural income (an equalizing component) and the increase in non agricultural 
income, i.e. wages or business income (a more disequalizing component), account for the largest part 
of the increase in rural inequality. In urban areas, the explosion of income disparities is related to 
pronounced changes in household income structures. Gao and Riskin (2009) showed that the relative 
increase in market income (a disequalizing component of income) compared to social benefits (an 
equalizing  component)  is  the  first  contributor  to  urban  inequality.  Furthermore,  among  market 
income, wages became more disequalizing between the beginning of the reforms and the early 
2000s (Benjamin et al., 2005a). Overall, changes in the labor market and the determination of wages 
are crucial factors for explaining the increase in urban inequality. 
The  issue  of  income  inequality  in  China  is  closely  linked  to  the  sustainability  of  China’s 
economic  development.  The  explosion  of  inequalities  may  pose  a  threat  to  social  cohesion  and 
political stability (Renard, 2002; Knight et al., 2006). Turzy (2008) explained that the explosion of 
inequality and spatial disparities have resulted in increased social unrest. Every year, the Chinese 
authorities release information concerning mass incidents such as strikes and demonstrations. The 
statistics provided by the Chinese authorities show a clear increase in the number of incidents (from 
10,000 in 1994 to 87,000 in 2005). This evolution may possibly constitute evidence of rising social 
tensions and may in turn threaten the stability and durability of economic growth. The Chinese 
authorities  are  aware  of  the  potentially  harmful  impact  of  inequality.  The  adoption  of  the 
‘Harmonious Society’ political doctrine in 2006 aims to shift the focus from economic growth to more 
societal objectives, such as the reduction of inequality and the emergence of the middle class. 
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The effect of changes in income distribution on social cohesion and political stability can be 
better  understood  by  considering  income  polarization  rather  than  income  inequality.  The 
phenomenon of polarization can be defined as “the extent to which a population is clustered around 
a small number of distant poles” (Esteban, 2002: 10) and is “closely linked to the generation of 
tensions, to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the existence of social unrest 
in general” (Esteban and Ray, 1994: 820). In the Chinese context, there have been very few empirical 
analyses of income polarization. Zhang and Kanbur (2001) showed that income polarization indices 
do not provide significantly different evidence compared to inequality indices. However, their study 
highlighted a strong spatial polarization between rural and urban areas and also between coastal and 
inland provinces. More recently, Araar (2008) provided evidence of income polarization in China. 
However, the chief focus of Araar’s paper is methodological rather than contextual. As argued by 
Chen and Zhang (2009), the analysis of income polarization should become a new focus of interest in 
the literature on inequality in China. The purpose of this paper is to investigate income polarization in 
rural and urban China by analyzing China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data over seven years 
between 1989 and 2006. To address China’s polarization issues, the most recent methods are used – 
mainly kernel densities and the DER (Duclos-Esteban-Ray) index. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section one presents the methodological choices made 
in the paper. Section two presents the CHNS data. Section three discusses the extent and evolution 
of income polarization in rural and urban areas. Section four identifies the main sources of income 
polarization  by  identifying  the contribution to  overall  polarization of  the various  components of 
income. 
2. Concepts and methods 
2.1. Kernel density 
The Kernel density estimator is the continuous alternative to histograms and a non-parametric 
tool aimed at estimating the probability density function of a random variable. Suppose that (x1, x2,…, 
xN) is a sample from X, where X has an unknown density function f(x). The expression of kernel 
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Where K denotes the kernel function
2 and h is a bandwidth parameter. The main advantage of 
a kernel density approach compared to inequality indices is that it provides a picture of total income 
distribution. As explained by Jenkins (1995: 408), “the basic idea [of the kernel density approach] is 
that one slides a viewing window along the income scale, and the estimate of the density depends on 
the number of observations that happen to fall within the window as it passes”. The degree of 
smoothing of the kernel density function depends on bandwidth h. A high level of h can produce an 
over-smoothed distribution, whereas a low level may result in an under-smoothed distribution. Many 
criteria have been proposed to determine optimal bandwidths.
3 Most procedures approximate the 
optimal  bandwidth  by  minimizing  an  error  measurement  component  under  specific  conditions. 
Among the available methods, this paper is based on the method developed by Sheather and Jones 
(1991).
4 The method involves an iterative approach which, as noted by Salgado-Ugarte (2003), has 
many excellent properties. In order to take into account the variability of densities between urban 
                                                      
2 In this paper, Gaussian kernel densities are used.  
3 For a synthesis, see Jones et al. (1996). 
4 This procedure was implemented using Xplore software: http://fedc.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/xplore.php.  An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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and rural areas and across years, a pooled bandwidth is also used, as suggested by Marron and 
Schmitz  (1992).  The  pooled  bandwidth  is  simply  defined  as  the  weighted  mean  of  the  initial 
bandwidths. 
2.2. The concept of polarization 
The concept of polarization was initially developed in sociology and political science in the 19
th 
century. While Alexis de Tocqueville wrote about the rising equality of social conditions and the 
emergence of  a middle  class  in  industrial  society,  Karl  Marx  raised  concerns  about  the  growing 
disparities  between  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  proletariat.  According  to Marx, the  polarization  (or 
bipolarization) of society would inevitably lead to social conflict.  
In economics, it was not until the early 1990s that the notion of polarization was formally 
analyzed, in Foster and Wolfson (1992), Wolfson (1994) and Esteban and Ray (1994). The specific 
objectives of these pioneer studies were to provide analytical tools for measuring the degree of 
income  polarization  and  for  testing  the  hypothesis  of  a  declining  middle  class  in  industrialized 
countries. More  recently, Duclos et  al.  (2004)  developed  a  new methodology  for  improving  the 
measurement of polarization. As explained by Gradin (2000: 457), the concept of polarization “is 
closely related to inequality; however its development emerged as a result of some dissatisfaction in 
the use of standard inequality measurement to deal with the formation of groups in a society”.  
Esteban and Ray (1994: 824) note that a polarized society is characterized by three features: (i) 
a small number of groups; (ii) a high degree of homogeneity within each group; and (iii) a strong 
degree of heterogeneity between groups. On this basis, they provide an analysis of polarization 
founded on an alienation / identification framework. Given a specific attribute (e.g. income), the 
identification component refers to homogeneity within groups, whereas the alienation component 
captures the extent of disparities between groups in terms of the specific attribute. Both elements, 
combined with the size of groups, produce significant antagonism among the population that may be 
harmful to social cohesion and lead to conflict. 
2.3. Polarization indices 
Gasparini  et al.  (2006) explain  that  income  polarization  can  be  classified  into  two  distinct 
categories. In the first category, i.e. polarization by characteristics, groups are identified on the basis 
of a discrete characteristic (e.g. region, ethnic group, religion). In the second category, i.e.  pure 
income polarization, groups are determined solely on the basis of income. The idea is that group 
members feel identification only with individuals of similar income levels. In this paper, we will refer 
to the second category and use three distinct indices. 
Wolfson index (W) 
The first pure polarization index was proposed by Foster and Wolfson (1992) and Wolfson 
(1994) and focuses on bipolarization. More precisely, the Wolfson index (W) is derived from the 
Lorenz curve and measures twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the tangent line at the 
median point. Where f represents income distribution and L the Lorenz curve, the Wolfson index is 
expressed as follows: 
[ ] [ ] ) ( ) 5 , 0 ( 5 , 0 2 2 ) ( f G L
m
f W - - =
m
     (2) 
Where L(0.5) is the income share of the bottom half of the population, μ and m are the median 
and mean incomes respectively, and G is the Gini index. The main drawback of the Wolfson index is An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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that it captures only bipolarization around the median point, and therefore focuses on two groups of 
equal size. 
Esteban-Gradin-Ray index (EGR) 
Unlike the Wolfson index, the ER (Esteban-Ray) index allows K groups of potentially different 
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With yi the income of group i, πi the share of group i in total population and α a parameter of 
sensitivity to polarization. When alpha = 0, the ER index is equivalent to the Gini index. The main 
drawback  of  the  ER  index  is  that  it  results  in  a  loss  of  information  about  intra-group  income 
distribution. This explains why Esteban et al. (2007) opted to extend the ER index by incorporating 
information  concerning  intra-group  dispersion.  Given  a  continuous  income  distribution  f  and  a 
discrete income distribution ρ* resulting from the partition, the EGR (Esteban-Gradin-Ray) index is 
expressed as follows: 
[ ] *) ( ) ( *) , ( ) *, , , ( r b r a b r a G f G ER f EGR - - =      (4) 
It is equal to the ER index minus the gap between the Gini index measured for the initial 
continuous income distribution f and the Gini index calculated for the discrete distribution induced 
by the K-group partition (ρ*). The main idea behind the correction is that there is a gap between the 
true  Lorenz  curve  and  the  discrete  Lorenz  curve.  In  this  paper,  the  EGR  index  is  calculated  by 
considering a two-group partition. The EGR methodology implies some drawbacks, mainly because of 
the arbitrary choice of the number of groups. 
Duclos-Esteban-Ray index (DER) 
Duclos et al. (2004) proposed a new measure of polarization. The advantages of the DER 
(Duclos-Esteban-Ray) index compared to the EGR index are that it is defined in a continuous form of 
income and does not require an arbitrary definition of the number of groups. Following Esteban and 
Ray  (1994),  the  DER  index  analyzes  polarization  by  referring  to  the  identification  /  alienation 
framework. For an individual with income x, identification depends on the density function f(x). 
When considering two individuals with income x and y respectively, alienation is measured by the 
distance x y - . The interaction between the two components characterizes the antagonism from x 
to y, which can be represented by the following function: 
( ) A I T ,      (5) 
Where ) (x f I = ,  x y A - = and  T  is  a  continuous  and  non  decreasing  function  such 
as 0 ) , 0 ( ) 0 , ( = = A T I T .  A  general  polarization  index  can  thus  be  defined  as  the  sum  of  all 
antagonisms characterizing income distribution: 
( ) ∫∫ = dydx y f x f A I T f P ) ( ) ( , ) (      (6) 
Taking into account several axioms to determine the functional form of T, Duclos et al. (2004) 
proposed the following polarization index: An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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∫∫ - =
+ dydx x y y f x f f DER ) ( ) ( ) , (
1 a a      (7) 
The parameter α captures the degree of aversion to polarization and belongs to the interval 
[0.25; 1]. If α = 0, the polarization index equals the Gini coefficient and ignores population clusters. 
For increasing values of α, the DER index emphasizes the growing importance of the formation of 
income groups in society.  
Using this methodology, changes in polarization can be analyzed based on the contribution of 
alienation  and  identification  and  their  correlation  (joint  co-movements).  On  the  one  hand,  an 
increase in alienation will be associated with a rise in income distances (inequality). On the other 
hand, an increase in identification will imply a sharper definition of income groups, e.g. if the biggest 
clusters  become  even  more  populated.  These  two  elements  interact,  and  may  reinforce  or 
counterbalance each other. 
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i y f is  the  non-parametric  estimation  of
a ) ( i y f derived  from  a  Gaussian  kernel 
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m ˆ is the mean sample.  
2.4. Decomposing the DER index 
Decomposition by groups 
Suppose that we are able to identify distinct groups (e.g. urban / rural). The objective of a 
group-based decomposition is to assess the proportion of overall polarization linked to within-group 
polarization and between-group polarization respectively. Let us denote by  m f the population share 
of group m and by  m y the income share of group m. Araar (2008) shows that the DER index can be 
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The first term is the within-group component. If a(x) is the alienation component and π(x) is 
the local proportion of households belonging to group m and earning income x, we have:
5  
                                                      
5 Araar (2008) explains that if income groups do not overlap,  1 ) ( = x m p  and consequently 1 = m R . An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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The second term (DER*) measures the between-group component. It is equivalent to the DER 
index when the within-group polarization is ignored, that is to say when we assume that every 
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With  m m m / m m = & . 
Decomposition by income components 
The  decomposition  of  the  DER  index  by  income  components  provided  by  Araar  (2008)  is 
derived from the Gini decomposition proposed by Rao (1969). Let us suppose that total income can 
be decomposed by several income sources and that k y is the share of source k in total income. 
Following Araar (2008), the DER index is given by: 
∑ =
k
k kCP DER y      (13) 
Where CPk is the pseudo-polarization index of income source k. Araar (2008: 14) explains that 
this  pseudo-polarization  index  “is  similar  to  the  concentration  index  except  for  its  sensitivity  to 
income identification component,
a ) (x f ”. 
3. Data 
Chen and Zhang (2009) emphasize the great variety of household level data in China. While the 
wide range of household data may represent a significant advantage, it may also cause problems of 
comparability between various empirical studies on income inequality. The most popular household 
data are those provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Research Centre on the Rural 
Economy (RCRE), the China Household Income Project (CHIP) and the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS). Although NBS surveys constitute official Chinese data, they present many drawbacks 
(Bramall, 2001). Firstly, they are based on a narrow definition of household income, since NBS data 
leave out crucial elements of income, such as various kinds of subsidies (Gao and Riskin, 2009). 
Secondly,  the  sampling  scheme  is  based  on  the  household  registration  system  (i.e.  the  hukou 
system)
6 rather than a population census. Rural migrants in cities are therefore not included in the 
sample (Bramall, 2001; Benjamin et al., 2005a; Ravallion and Chen, 2007). Thirdly, as explained by 
Ravallion and Chen (2007), there is an underrepresentation of poor households living in remote rural 
areas. In view of these weaknesses (largely addressed in the literature), this research uses alternative 
data sources. RCRE data are specific to rural areas, whereas CHIP and CHNS data cover both urban 
and rural areas. In this study, we use CHNS data. 
The CHNS is a longitudinal survey conducted by an international collaborative project involving 
the Carolina Population Centre at the University of North Carolina, the National Institute of Nutrition 
and Food Safety, and the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. CHNS data cover a wide 
                                                      
6 The hukou system involves a household registration system that categorizes individuals as urban or rural residents. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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range  of topics.  Although  the main  aim of  the  survey  is  to  analyze  health, nutrition  and  family 
planning  in  rural  and  urban  China,  other  information  concerning  income,  the  labor  market  and 
education is also collected. The survey includes seven waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 
and 2006). The period covered is therefore long enough to provide a long-term view of the impact of 
Chinese reforms on income distribution. The population size for 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 
and 2006 is respectively 3,743, 3,586, 3,410, 3,805, 4,300, 4,318, and 4,359 households. This means 
that  approximately  14,000  individuals  were  surveyed  during  each  wave.  CHNS  data  cover  nine 
provinces,  including  Guangxi,  Guizhou,  Heilongjiang,  Henan,  Hubei,  Hunan,  Jiangsu,  Liaoning  and 
Shandong.
7 Although the survey is not nationally representative, provinces are selected to provide a 
highly diversified picture of geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. For instance, the survey 
covers both coastal and mainland provinces, but also rich provinces (Jiangsu and Shandong) and 
poorer provinces (Guizhou). CHNS data are representative of rural and urban areas and of each 
province. The main drawback of CHNS data is that major Chinese cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin or Hong Kong are not covered. 
CHNS  household  income  includes  wages,  retirement  income,  business  income,  agricultural 
income, subsidies and other income (private transfers and rents). In this paper, annual per capita 
household income expressed at 2006 prices was used. One advantage of CHNS data is that they 
provide a consumer price index that is specific to rural and urban areas but also to the different 
provinces included in the sample. Therefore, the income measure provided in this paper incorporates 
both temporal and spatial prices differences.  
Table  1  summarizes  descriptive  statistics  for  global,  rural  and  urban  per  capita  household 
income. Over the period 1989-2006, the mean income increased by 181 %, reaching 7,371 Yuan in 
2006. All in all, the mean urban household income is higher than the mean rural household income, 
but the distribution of income appears to be more heterogeneous in urban areas. For instance, in 
2006, the coefficient of variation was 1.32 for urban incomes and only 1.26 in the case of rural 
incomes. Furthermore, the mean urban household income increased faster than the mean rural 
household income (+194% against +147%). The ratio of urban to rural mean income has increased, 
especially since the beginning of the 2000s. The discrepancy of income growth rates may have the 
effect of increasing the gap between urban and rural areas. 
Table 1: Key figures on annual per capita household income (Yuan, 2006 prices). 
   Total     Rural     Urban 
   Urban to 
rural 
   N  Mean  Std. Dev.     N  Mean  Std. Dev.     N  Mean  Std. Dev.     ratio 
                           
1989  3743  2622.48  2628.83    2493  2339.09  2513.62    1250  3187.65  2760.15    1.36 
1991  3586  2559.60  1913.57    2420  2347.71  1957.51    1166  2999.37  1739.22    1.28 
1993  3410  2955.11  2552.89    2368  2723.62  2378.51    1042  3481.18  2842.52    1.28 
1997  3805  3702.15  3100.10    2548  3479.72  3026.37    1257  4153.04  3198.52    1.19 
2000  4300  4785.22  4989.58    2915  4298.59  4601.16    1385  5809.43  5586.48    1.35 
2004  4318  6371.11  6691.68    2940  5570.92  5984.01    1378  8078.32  7724.82    1.45 
2006  4359  7371.00  9791.70    2959  6417.23  8084.17    1400  9386.84  12429.53    1.46 
                                         
Source: CHNS. 
 
                                                      
7 A number of changes concerning the provinces covered by the survey were made between 1989 and 2006. For instance, in 1989, only 
eight provinces (Heilongjiang excluded) were covered. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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4. Extent and evolution of income polarization 
4.1 Overall inequality and polarization 
Table  2  presents  trends  in  inequality  and  polarization  from  1989  to  2006.  There  are  two 
distinct phases in the evolution of inequality and polarization indices. Inequality decreased in the 
early 1990s before stagnating until the end of the decade. In 1989 and 1997, the inequality level 
remained almost the same irrespective of the index considered. The late 1990s represent a turning 
point in income disparity trends. From 1997 to 2006, household income inequality soared, with the 
Gini and Theil indices increasing from 0.401 to 0.513 (+27.9%) and from 0.273 to 0.480 (+75.8%) 
respectively.  
Tables 2: Inequality and polarization indices, all households. 
   Gini  Theil     W  EGR
1     DER
2 
                     Total  Alienation  Identification  Correlation 
                     
1989  0.391  0.286    0.170  0.137    0.232  0.391  0.687  -0.137 
1991  0.372  0.234    0.169  0.132    0.225  0.372  0.689  -0.121 
1993  0.413  0.291    0.199  0.148    0.241  0.413  0.679  -0.139 
1997  0.401  0.273    0.185  0.143    0.235  0.401  0.679  -0.137 
2000  0.448  0.356    0.202  0.159    0.252  0.448  0.669  -0.158 
2004  0.483  0.395    0.239  0.175    0.269  0.483  0.666  -0.165 
2006  0.513  0.480    0.253  0.185    0.283  0.513  0.679  -0.187 
                                
Notes: (1) Based on a two-group partition; (2) For α =0.5. 
Source: CHNS. 
Polarization indices do not highlight significantly different trends, although the overall trend is 
significantly more attenuated.
8 The FW and EGR indices – both hypothesizing two income groups in 
the present case – suggest that income bipolarization increased by 48.8 % and 35 % respectively 
between 1989 and 2006. However, the majority of the increase occurred between 1997 and 2006. 
The DER polarization index followed a similar evolution. For α = 0.5,
9 the DER polarization index 
remained relatively stable between 1989 and 1997 (at approximately 0.23). Between 1997 and 2006, 
the  DER  index  increased  continuously  (+20.4 %),  reaching  0.283  in  2006.  This  indicates  that 
household income is relatively polarized in China. As a comparison, Duclos et al. (2004) found that 
Russia and Mexico recorded high income polarization levels in the mid-1990s, with a DER index of 
0.257 and 0.283 respectively. 
Based on kernel densities (Figure 1), the increase of polarization implies a significant shift of 
household income distribution between 1989 and 2006. In 1989, household income distribution has 
a unimodal shape, with a modal value at around 2,000 Yuan. In 2006, income distribution differed 
significantly and became clearly multimodal. The highest peak is still at around 2,000 Yuan, but three 
local modes appear in the right tail, at approximately 4,000, 6,500 and 9,000 Yuan. A bump close to 
15,500  Yuan  is  also  found.  In  fact,  the  emergence  of  local  modes  reveals  the  constitution  of 
population clusters, especially in the middle and upper income classes. There is also a reduction in 
the thickness of the tail relative to the lowest income ranges. This can be explained by the significant 
                                                      
8 Zhang and Kanbur (2001) also found that inequality and polarization measures increased at a substantially different rate over the period 
1983-1995. 
9 Only the trends in DER index for α = 0.5 are reported since values close to 0.25 and 1 may conflict with some axioms (Duclos et al., 2004: 
1744 and 1758).  An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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decline in poverty since the beginning of economic reforms.
10 Overall, between 1989 and 2006, the 
dramatic shift in density curves confirms the view that household income in China is becoming ever 
more polarized.  
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Source: CHNS.  
The distinction between alienation and identification components can be used to extend the 
analysis. Table 2 shows that the increase in polarization is mainly due to the hugely significant rise in 
the alienation component (i.e. the rise of inequality). However, this increase is counterbalanced and 
attenuated  by  the  relative  stability  (or  even  slight  decrease)  of  the  identification  component. 
Therefore, we may conclude that social tensions have increased in Chinese society as a result of 
exacerbated differences between income groups (i.e. increasing alienation). Nevertheless, the risk of 
social unrest is probably still limited since individuals do not identify more than before with their 
income group. 
4.2 Decomposition by group 
To  complete  the  analysis,  this  subsection  focuses  on  rural-urban  income  disparities. 
Decomposition procedures are used to assess the contribution of between-group and within-group 
disparities  to  overall  inequality  and  polarization.  The  between-group  component  measures  the 
contribution of the urban-rural income gap to inequality and polarization, whereas the within-group 
component accounts for income disparities within rural and urban areas. The results are presented in 
Table 3. 
                                                      
10 As an illustration, Ravallion and Chen (2007) showed that the proportion of Chinese people living in poverty dropped from 53 % to 8 % 
between 1981 and 2001. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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Table 3: Inequality and polarization indices decomposition by groups (rural-urban). Relative 
contributions of within-group and between-group components. 
   Gini     Theil     DER
1 
   Within  Between  Overlap     Within  Between     Intra-group  Inter-group 
                   
1989  0.536  0.184  0.280    0.960  0.039    0.538  0.462 
1991  0.549  0.150  0.301    0.971  0.030    0.549  0.451 
1993  0.557  0.132  0.311    0.977  0.023    0.562  0.438 
1997  0.547  0.100  0.353    0.987  0.013    0.550  0.450 
2000  0.538  0.154  0.308    0.971  0.030    0.545  0.455 
2004  0.528  0.177  0.295    0.958  0.041    0.537  0.463 
2006  0.527  0.171  0.302    0.962  0.035    0.535  0.465 
                             
Note: (1) For α =0.5. 
Source: CHNS. 
The rural-urban decomposition of Theil and Gini indices indicates that the between component 
decreased  from  1989  to  1997,
11  before  increasing  slightly  between  2000  and  2006.  But  the 
contribution of the between-group component to overall inequality is very limited (on average less 
than 4 % for the Theil index and 16 % for the Gini index). This may suggest that, based on CHNS data, 
the urban-rural gap is not as considerable as previous studies had found (e.g. Gustafsson and Li, 
2001; Sicular et al., 2007). However, this finding is consistent with the study by Benjamin et al. 
(2005a), which also reports a similar counter-result. Benjamin et al. found that the urban-rural gap 
only accounts for a small part of the overall inequality and that rural income follows the urban 
income  trend.  In  fact,  the  low  contribution  of  the  rural-urban  gap  to  overall  inequality  is  likely 
compensated by a significant contribution of regional disparities, especially between coastal and 
inland provinces.
12 In the rural-urban decomposition used in this paper, the coastal-inland gap is 
included in the within component and therefore explains the significant contribution of intra-group 
inequality. 
Strikingly, the decomposition of the DER index is far more balanced. Income polarization is 
slightly more influenced by the within component, the relative contribution of which (53.5 % in 2006) 
suggests  the  existence  of  income  divergences  in  rural  and  urban  areas.  Nevertheless,  the  non-
negligible contribution of between-group variations (46.5 % in 2006) implies that there are significant 
differences between rural and urban income polarization. 
4.3 Rural and urban income polarization 
In view of the significant contribution of within-group inequality and polarization, the level and 
evolution of disparities within rural and urban areas will now be examined. Tables 4 and 5 report 




                                                      
11 Using household data from 1978 to 1997, Yang and Fang (2003) calculated income and consumption ratios and also reported a decline in 
the rural-urban gap since 1993. 
12 In this respect, Kanbur and Zhang (1999), and Zhang and Yao (2001) used provincial data and found that the inland-coastal gap increased 
sharply throughout the 1990s and became the major component of overall inequality. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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Table 4: Inequality and polarization indices, rural households. 
   Gini  Theil     W  EGR
1     DER
2 
                     Total  Alienation  Identification  Correlation 
                                
1989  0.424  0.325    0.201  0.152    0.247  0.424  0.651  -0.103 
1991  0.401  0.274    0.188  0.143    0.237  0.401  0.663  -0.106 
1993  0.426  0.305    0.207  0.154    0.248  0.426  0.658  -0.114 
1997  0.414  0.289    0.200  0.149    0.242  0.414  0.663  -0.117 
2000  0.457  0.368    0.217  0.163    0.257  0.457  0.643  -0.123 
2004  0.485  0.402    0.238  0.175    0.269  0.485  0.637  -0.125 
2006  0.516  0.477    0.253  0.187    0.283  0.516  0.646  -0.147 
                                
Notes: (1) Based on a two-group partition; (2) For α =0.5. 
Source: CHNS. 
Table 5: Inequality and polarization indices, urban households. 
   Gini  Theil     W  EGR
1     DER
2 
                     Total  Alienation  Identification  Correlation 
                     
1989  0.310  0.202    0.115  0.105    0.201  0.310  0.722  -0.097 
1991  0.297  0.152    0.118  0.102    0.194  0.297  0.715  -0.080 
1993  0.373  0.249    0.161  0.131    0.223  0.373  0.707  -0.145 
1997  0.370  0.238    0.149  0.128    0.220  0.370  0.700  -0.142 
2000  0.413  0.311    0.168  0.143    0.236  0.413  0.704  -0.179 
2004  0.455  0.345    0.214  0.162    0.253  0.455  0.701  -0.197 
2006  0.484  0.441    0.214  0.170    0.266  0.484  0.713  -0.215 
                                
Notes: (1) Based on a two-group partition; (2) For α =0.5. 
Source: CHNS. 
Rural  inequality  remained  relatively  stable  until  1997,  whereas  urban  inequality  began  to 
increase from 1993. Furthermore, the rise in inequality was more substantial in urban areas, where 
the Gini coefficient increased by 56.1 % between 1989 and 2006, compared to just 21.7 % in rural 
areas. As a result, income inequality was still higher in rural areas than in urban areas in 2006, but 
the gap has narrowed since urban disparities increased faster than rural disparities. The DER index 
suggests that income polarization is also higher for rural households, as noted previously by Zhang 
and Kanbur (2001). However, in addition to inequality, the increase in polarization is far more striking 
in  urban  areas,  where  the  DER  index  increased  from  0.201  to  0.266  (+32.3 %  compared  to  just 
+14.6 % in rural areas). The analysis of density curves sheds light on the underlying phenomena 







 An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
  14
























0 4000 8000 12000 16000 20000
Household per capita income (2006 prices)
 1989  1997
 2006
Density curves - Rural
 
Note: Optimal bandwidth = 288.693 Yuan. 
Source: CHNS. 
























0 4000 8000 12000 16000 20000
Household per capita income (2006 prices)
 1989  1997
 2006
Density curves - Urban
 
Note: Optimal bandwidth = 577.49 Yuan. 
Source: CHNS. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
  15
Figure 2 shows that in 1989, the kernel density curve for rural areas is unimodal, with a modal 
value  of  approximately  1,000  Yuan.  In  2006,  this  mode  rises  to  1,600  Yuan,  but  the  income 
distribution also becomes multimodal. Several local modes emerge at around 4,500, 6,000 and 9,000 
Yuan.  The  left  tail  of  the  distribution  thins  down  considerably,  indicating  a  decline  in  the 
concentration at the lowest income levels. This shift can be related to the significant decline in 
poverty in rural areas. As an illustration, Ravallion and Chen (2007) found that approximately 75-80 % 
of the decline in national poverty incidence is due to poverty reduction in rural sectors. There is also 
evidence  of  a  change  in  density  toward  middle  and  upper  income  levels,  which  become  more 
concentrated. This suggests that some individuals are becoming clustered around local modes in the 
middle-upper income ranges. The shift in density curves is even more striking in urban areas, as 
shown in Figure 3. Whereas the shape of the distribution is leptokurtic and unimodal in 1989, it 
becomes nearly platykurtik in 2006. The former modal value (at around 2,500 Yuan) turns into a 
slight bump, and two modal values appear at approximately 3,500 and 6,500 Yuan. Note also the 
emergence of two other local modes, at around 9,000 and 15,000 Yuan. These local modes provide 
evidence of a considerable shift of density toward middle and upper income ranges and support the 
idea of an emerging urban middle class.
13 Furthermore, and contrary to rural areas, we may also note 
that the very left tail of the distribution thickens significantly. Following Wang (2004), this may lend 
support to the idea of a “new urban poverty” in China. The new urban poverty and the emergence of 
middle  and  upper  income  classes  are  the  main  phenomena  associated  with  the  surge  in  urban 
polarization. From our point of view, these factors suggest that the risk of social unrest is more 
prevalent in Chinese cities than in rural areas.  
To  provide  a  more  detailed  analysis,  rural-urban  differences  can  be  further  clarified  and 
explored  in  the  light  of  the  decomposition  of  DER  indices  into  alienation  and  identification 
components, as shown in Tables 4 and 5. Despite the rise in the alienation component for rural 
households, the increase in rural income polarization is moderate since the identification component 
has stagnated and even slightly decreased since 2000. In other words, income disparities between 
rural households are accentuated but rural households become a little more scattered around the 
mean income of their group. The decrease in the identification component in rural areas suggests 
that households in the same range of income are less and less similar and so are less aware of 
sharing common interests. In urban areas, the trend of alienation and identification components is 
relatively similar, but the increase in polarization was more significant since the rise in the alienation 
component is associated with a relative stability of the identification component. Furthermore, the 
level of identification is significantly higher in cities than in rural areas, thus confirming the idea that 
social tensions are more likely to occur in urban areas than in rural areas. The rural-urban gap 
concerning  the  identification  component  also  serves  to  explain  the  non-negligible  share  of  the 
between-group component in the DER index (compared to the inequality indices).  
5. The sources of income polarization 
Based on CHNS data, household income can be broken down into six components: wages, 
business income, agricultural income, subsidies, retirement income and other income. Agricultural 
income includes farming, fishing, gardening and livestock incomes. Other income includes a range of 
components such as rents from leased land and non-land assets, money from family, friends or 
relatives (including remittances from rural migrants in Chinese cities), the value of in-kind gifts from 
family, friends or relatives and enterprises. Following Gao and Riskin (2009), these components are 
                                                      
13 By identifying the middle classes in developing countries as people belonging to households with a per capita consumption above the 
median poverty line and below the US poverty line, Ravallion (2010) showed that the middle class increased by 1.2 billion of people 
between 1990 and 2005, and that half of this surge can be attributed to China. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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also aggregated to distinguish market income (wages, business income and agricultural income), 
social benefits (retirement income and subsidies) and other income. 
Tables 6 and 7 present the results of the DER decomposition by income components, for rural 
and urban households respectively in 1989, 1997 and 2006. Three elements are reported: the share 
of different components in total income, the concentration index associated with each component 
(pseudo-polarization), and the contribution of each component to overall polarization. On this basis, 
an income source may be considered to be depolarizing (polarizing) if its contribution to polarization 
is lower (greater) than its share in total income or if the concentration index of the component is 
lower (greater) than the overall DER index. 
5.1. Rural areas 
As previously noted, Table 6 indicates a stability of income polarization between 1989 and 
1997 and a significant increase from 1997 to 2006. While the share of social benefits is relatively 
constant between 1989 and 2006, a decrease in the proportion of market income in total income and 
an increase in other income is observed. Nevertheless, market income is still predominant in 2006, 
representing roughly 75% of total income.
14 In 2006, other income accounts for 16% of total income 
(compared to just 5% in 1989).
15 This trend provides evidence of the increasing role of remittances 
from rural migrants to cities. The loosening of the constraints imposed by the hukou system
16 on 
rural-urban migration facilitated mass migration flows during the 1990s and the 2000s. According to 
Li (2008), the number of rural out-migrant workers increased from 2 million in 1978 to 30 million in 
1989 and to over 130 million in 2006.  
For market income, the results indicate a decline of agricultural income compared to non 
agricultural income (wages and business income). The comparison of the share of both components 
in  total  income  with  their  contribution  to  polarization  indicates  that  a  disequalizing  income 
component (i.e. non agricultural income) replaced an equalizing income component (i.e. agricultural 
income). The change in the structure of market income explains why market income was a polarizing 
component in 2006, whereas it was relatively depolarizing in 1989. The role of non-farm income in 
the increase of rural income inequality has already been largely documented (Hare, 1994; Benjamin 
et al., 2005a, 2005b; Chen and Zhang, 2009; Gao and Riskin, 2009). 
The  depolarizing  effect  of  agricultural  income  is  linked  to  a  relatively  egalitarian  land 
distribution.  For  instance,  Wan  and  Zhou  (2005)  show  that  among  capital  endowments  and 
geographic factors, the only determinant that contributes negatively to inequality is land. In 1989, 
agricultural income accounted for almost 50% of the total income of rural households. As suggested 
by Benjamin et al. (2005a), this is a reflection of the fact that nearly all rural households in China had 
been allocated land. However, the structure of rural market income had changed drastically by the 
end of the period. In 2006, agricultural income accounted for just 26% of total income, whereas the 
proportion  of  non  agricultural  income  (wages  and  business  income)  reached  47%.  According  to 
Benjamin et al. (2005a), the expansion of Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) in the 1980s and 
1990s contributed significantly to the development of off-farm opportunities in some rural areas. 
TVEs are economic units located in rural areas, which are not involved in agriculture but in industry 
or services (Fu and Balasubramanyam, 2003). They consist of the former commune and brigade 
enterprises, which were renamed township enterprises and village enterprises respectively in 1984. 
                                                      
14 Using CHIP data, Gao and Riskin (2009) also highlight the predominance of market income in rural areas. 
15 The impact of other income on polarization is neutral insofar as its contribution to polarization is equal to its share in total income. 
16 The hukou system was established as a permanent system in 1958 to control migration from rural to urban areas. Under this system, 
rural migrants to cities had at best a temporary permit of residency and were deemed more often to be clandestine. The system has 
created strong barriers between rural areas and cities but was relaxed from the mid 1990s. For further information about the hukou 
system, see Chan and Buckingham (2008). An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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In a broad sense, TVEs also include farmers’ cooperatives and individual or family businesses. Based 
on this broader definition, official statistics show that between 1978 and 2003, the number of TVEs 
was multiplied by 4.8, increasing from 28.3 to 135.7 million (Yang, 2005). The main point is that non-
farm income is clearly polarizing whereas agricultural income is still depolarizing. The 2006 values of 
the  concentration  indices  provide  clear  evidence  of  this  gap.  The  concentration  or  pseudo-
polarization  index  for  agricultural  income  is  under  0.16,  whereas  it  is  above  0.3  for  wages  and 
business income. We suggest that the capacity of some rural households to benefit from non-farm 
opportunities probably accounts for the constitution of identified clusters in the middle (middle 
class?) of the 2006 rural income distribution, as highlighted by kernel densities. In other words, the 
increase in income polarization in rural areas is closely linked to the inequality of opportunities for 
non-farm activities.  
The proportion of social benefits in total income remained relatively stable between 1989 and 
2006 and was extremely low (around 10%). Nonetheless, a rise in the share of retirement income 
from 1% in 1989 to 9% is observed in 2006. However, retirement income in rural China is limited 
compared to urban areas, where it reaches 33% of total income (Table 7). Moreover, retirement 
income is a polarizing component since its contribution to the DER index is higher than its share in 
total income. Several studies examining the Chinese pension system have emphasized the marginal 
role of the social benefits system (particularly pensions) in rural areas (Hu, 2006; Gao, 2008). As 
explained by Gao (2008: 345), “only a very small privileged group of rural residents has had access to 
pensions  due  to  their  prior  employment  in  state-owned  or  collective  enterprises”.  The  ‘five 
guarantees’ program was designed to assist the most vulnerable elderly people in rural areas by 
providing food, clothing, housing, medical assistance and burial expenses. Eligible individuals include 
those with no family members to support them, no ability to work and no source of income. These 
restrictive conditions explain why only a minority of Chinese rural elders have been able to benefit 
from  this  system  (Lowry,  2009;  Shen  and  Williamson,  2010).
17  The  assistance  provided  to 
beneficiaries is not adequate in many rural areas (Gao, 2008). The introduction of a pension scheme 
in rural areas is a major task for the objective of poverty reduction in rural areas and may contribute 
to the reduction of the degree of income polarization in rural China.
18 
  
                                                      
17 In 2007, 5.3 million rural elderly people benefited from the five guarantees system, while 3.9 million people benefited from the old 
pension scheme. Given that there are 100 million elders in rural areas, the coverage rate is less than 10% (Shen and Williamson, 2010). 
18 In 2009, the Chinese authorities began to implement a new rural pension reform articulated around four principles: (i) a guaranteed basic 
benefit; (ii) wide coverage; (iii) regional flexibility; and (iv) sustainability (Shen and Williamson, 2010). An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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Table 6: DER index decomposition by income components (α = 0.5), rural households. 
      1989           1997           2006    
  Income  Concentration  Contribution    Income  Concentration  Contribution    Income  Concentration  Contribution 
   share  index  to polarization     share  index  to polarization     share  index  to polarization 
                       
Market income  0.84  0.233  0.80    0.85  0.240  0.85    0.74  0.273  0.71 
Agricultural income  0.47  0.156  0.30    0.39  0.135  0.22    0.26  0.157  0.15 
Business income  0.07  0.289  0.08    0.15  0.305  0.19    0.12  0.315  0.13 
Wages  0.30  0.340  0.42    0.31  0.342  0.44    0.35  0.345  0.43 
Social benefits  0.11  0.340  0.16    0.05  0.345  0.07    0.10  0.366  0.13 
Subsidies  0.10  0.339  0.14    0.02  0.344  0.02    0.01  0.359  0.02 
Retirement  0.01  0.354  0.02    0.03  0.345  0.05    0.09  0.367  0.11 
Other income  0.05  0.242  0.04    0.10  0.198  0.08    0.16  0.275  0.16 
                       
DER index     0.247           0.242           0.283    
Source: CHNS. 
 
Table 7: DER index decomposition by income components (α = 0.5), urban households. 
      1989           1997           2006    
  Income  Concentration  Contribution    Income  Concentration  Contribution    Income  Concentration  Contribution 
   share  index  to polarization     share  index  to polarization     share  index  to polarization 
                       
Market income  0.59  0.235  0.69    0.70  0.232  0.74    0.56  0.272  0.57 
Agricultural income  0.04  0.145  0.03    0.02  0.169  0.02    0.01  0.080  0.00 
Business income  0.06  0.263  0.08    0.13  0.212  0.13    0.08  0.173  0.05 
Wages  0.49  0.238  0.58    0.55  0.239  0.59    0.47  0.292  0.52 
Social benefits  0.37  0.146  0.27    0.21  0.206  0.20    0.34  0.288  0.37 
Subsidies  0.30  0.129  0.19    0.08  0.255  0.09    0.03  0.322  0.04 
Retirement  0.07  0.219  0.08    0.13  0.177  0.11    0.31  0.284  0.33 
Other income  0.04  0.216  0.04    0.09  0.158  0.06    0.10  0.159  0.06 
                       
DER index     0.201           0.220           0.266    
Source: CHNS. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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Overall, the results concerning income polarization tend to confirm the findings highlighted in 
the literature dealing with inequality: the rise of rural polarization and inequality is closely linked to 
non agricultural opportunities in rural areas.  
5.2. Urban areas 
The results of the decomposition of the DER index by income components point to a relative 
stability of the three main components of income (market income, social benefits and other income) 
in urban areas, if we compare 1989 and 2006. While a predominance of market income (74% in 
2006) was found in rural areas, the income structure appears to be more balanced in cities: 56% for 
market income, 34% for social benefits and 10% for other income. Despite this relative inertia, the 
share of other income increased significantly over the period, from 4% in 1989 to 10% in 2006. This 
component is relatively depolarizing since its contribution to polarization is lower than its share in 
total income. This is indicative of the increasing  role of private transfers and social networks in 
mitigating inequality and polarization.  
When considering market income, the main result concerns the polarizing effect of wages, 
irrespective of the year considered. For instance, in 2006, the share of wages in total income was 
47%, whereas its contribution to the DER index reached 52% and the gap was far more pronounced 
in 1989 (49% compared to 58%). The disequalizing effect of wages has already been emphasized in 
the literature and is closely linked to the gradual transition to market mechanisms (Gustafsson and Li, 
2001; Khan and Riskin, 2005; Benjamin et al., 2005a; Knight and Song, 2006; Gustafsson et al., 2008). 
First,  the  liberalization of  the  urban  labor market,  even within  the  state sector,  has resulted  in 
increased  wage  inequality  since  the  method  of  wage  determination  takes  better  account  of 
differences in productivity. Second, the restructuring of State enterprises (particularly their increased 
freedom to hire or lay off workers) has resulted in significant unemployment and has consequently 
increased inequalities in access to employment. 
The  main  significant  evolution  of  the  urban  income  structure  concerns  social  benefits.  A 
significant decrease in the share of social benefits is observed, particularly between 1989 and 1997.
19 
This decline is explained primarily by the decrease in the share of subsidies from 30% to 8%. The 
declining  role  of  subsidies  has  already  been  addressed  in  previous  studies  (Khan  et  al.,  1999; 
Benjamin et al., 2005a). During the pre-reform period, subsidies on food, housing and transport 
services were publicly funded and relatively equally allocated by work units. Subsidies were slashed 
in the 1990s, thereby removing the main inequality-attenuating component of income. 
The  decline  in  subsidies  was  compensated  by  a  significant  increase  in  the  proportion  of 
retirement income between 1997 and 2006. The expansion of retirement income is linked to the 
urban pension reform introduced in 1997. In 1997, the State Council promulgated a Decision on 
establishing a uniform basic old age insurance system for enterprise employees aimed at establishing 
a  multi-pillar  system  combining  a  public  mandatory  pension  and  a  private  voluntary  pension.
20 
Contrary  to  subsidies,  retirement  income  exerts  a  polarizing  effect  since  its  contribution  to 
polarization is stronger than its share in total income in 2006. Wage differentials created by the 
liberalization of the urban labor market are now reproduced at retirement age. This explains why the 
substitution of retirement income for subsidies resulted in a polarizing effect of social benefits in 
2006, whereas they were relatively depolarizing in 1989.  
 
                                                      
19 The decrease in subsidies resulted in a relative increase of market income, particularly wages. 
20 This program has been followed by other decisions. For a discussion, see Hu (2006). An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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The  study  by  Benjamin  et  al.  (2005a)  draws  a  distinction  between  transition  process  and 
development process to explain the rise of inequality in China. The development process describes a 
pure scale effect by which economic growth improves the standard of living. The transition process 
captures the effect of institutional change and in particular the shift toward market mechanisms for 
the valuation of productive endowments. Although it is impossible to clearly identify both effects, 
the distinction helps to explain the rise in polarization in urban China. In the previous section, the 
analysis  of  kernel  densities  served  to  highlight  a  shift  from  a  leptokurtic  and  unimodal  income 
distribution  in  1989  to  a  platykurtik  and  multimodal  distribution  in  2006.  In  other  words,  two 
underlying phenomena are associated with increased polarization: (i) a decrease in the density of low 
income levels resulting in the quasi-disappearance of the mode in the bottom of distribution and (ii) 
the emergence of middle and upper income classes characterized by the appearance of several local 
modes.  The  decrease  in  the  proportion of  households  with  low  incomes  is  likely  related to the 
development effect and to the continuous increase in mean income induced by economic growth. 
The emergence of local modes in the 2006 distribution is more strongly related to the transition 
process.  The  liberalization  of  the  urban  labor  market  and  state  enterprises  has  resulted  in 
inequalities  of  access  to  employment  and  wage  disparities.  This  paper  suggests  that  these 
inequalities account for the clustering of population around intermediate and high income levels. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this article was to contribute to the analysis of Chinese income inequality by 
focusing more specifically on income polarization. As suggested by Esteban and Ray (1994), the risk 
of social tensions is better addressed by polarization than inequality since polarization focuses on the 
formation of groups and captures both alienation (i.e. the degree of heterogeneity between groups) 
and identification (i.e. the degree of homogeneity within groups). The analysis of income polarization 
conducted in this paper was based on CHNS household level data from 1989 to 2006 and relied 
primarily  on  the  DER  (Duclos-Esteban-Ray)  index,  its  decompositions  (by  groups  and  by  income 
sources) and kernel densities. 
Six main results can be drawn from the various investigations conducted as part of this study. 
First, two phases can be identified in the evolution of income inequality and polarization: (i) a period 
of stagnation between 1989 and 1997 and (ii) a period of increase from 1997 to 2006. It is important 
to note that the rise in polarization is more moderate than the increase of inequality. In fact, the 
increase  in the  alienation  component  is  attenuated  by  the  relative  stability of  the  identification 
component.  Nonetheless,  the  level  of  polarization  in  2006  is  high  and  comparable  to  the  level 
prevailing in highly-polarized countries such as Russia and Mexico (Duclos et al., 2004). Second, the 
increase in polarization conceals dramatic shifts in the income distribution, as indicated by kernel 
densities. More precisely, the income distribution moved from a leptokurtic and unimodal shape in 
1989 to a more platykurtik and multimodal shape in 2006. This provides evidence of the emergence 
of middle and upper income classes in both rural and urban areas. Third, the share of the between-
group (rural-urban) component in overall polarization is higher than the share of the between-group 
component in overall inequality. This indicates a significant degree of rural-urban polarization, as 
emphasized by Zhang and Kanbur (2001). Fourth, even if the level of income polarization is higher in 
rural areas, the increase in polarization is far more conspicuous in urban areas, suggesting that the 
risk of social tensions is more pregnant in Chinese cities. Fifth, the analysis of the sources of income 
polarization in rural areas shows that the increase in polarization is closely linked to non agricultural 
opportunities  issued  from  Township  and  Village  Enterprises  (TVEs).  Sixth,  in  urban  areas,  the 
emergence  of  identified  groups  in  middle  and  upper  income  classes,  characterizing  the  rise  in 
polarization, can be explained by two phenomena: (i) the sharp decline in subsidies, which were a 
depolarizing  income  component,  and  (ii)  the  liberalization  of  the  urban  labor  market  and  state 
enterprises, resulting in inequalities in access to employment and wage disparities. An analysis of income polarization in rural and urban China 
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To  a  great  extent,  the  increase  in  inequality  and  polarization  in  China  is  linked  to  the 
development strategy implemented since the 1980s. Based on Deng Xiaoping’s decision to ‘let some 
people get rich first’, the first stage of economic reforms has clearly favored coastal provinces and 
cities.  The  implemented  policies  have  enabled  China  to  grow  rapidly,  but  have  also  resulted  in 
increased social and regional disparities. The risk of social unrest associated with an increasingly 
divided  society  has  recently  raised  concerns  among  Chinese  authorities.  Contrary  to  previous 
governments, Hu Jintao’s administration recognizes that China needs to move toward a new stage of 
development based on ‘common prosperity’. In this respect, the Chinese Communist Party adopted 
the  concept  of  ‘harmonious  society’  in  2006  aimed  at  achieving  a  fairer  and  more  balanced 
development. The 11
th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), which emphasizes the issues of distribution and 
sustainability, shows that the promotion of a ‘harmonious society’ has become a new priority (Fan, 
2006). The shift toward societal objectives appears to be even more obvious following the recent 
adoption  of  the  12
th  Five-Year  Plan  (2011-2015)  in  March  2011.  The  Chinese  authorities  have 
identified several threats to ongoing development and have proposed guidelines aimed at addressing 
these challenges. Among these objectives, some directly concern issues related to inequality and 
polarization. Improving people’s livelihoods to ensure the transition toward a ‘happier society’ is at 
the heart of the latest Five-Year Plan.
21 The government plans to increase per capita income and the 
minimum wage at an annual rate of 7 % and 13 % respectively. A comprehensive public social welfare 
system is also due to be introduced to provide government benefit programs. For instance, within 
the next five years, pension schemes should cover all rural residents and 357 million people in urban 
areas.  The  criteria  for  acquiring  urban  hukou  will  also  be  relaxed  to  accelerate  urbanization, 
particularly in medium-sized and small cities. 
It now seems essential for China to tackle the issues of income inequality and polarization to 
ensure  the  transformation  of  its  economic  development model  and  to  reduce  the  risk  of  social 
unrest. Since the global economic crisis in 2007-2008, China has attempted to refocus on its internal 
market to move from export-led growth to domestic-led growth. From this perspective, narrowing 
the income gap is considered to be necessary for stimulating the consumption of the many Chinese 
households with low and middle incomes. 
 
                                                      
21 See: “The 12th Five-Year Plan: Making China a Better Place”, speech delivered by Ambassador Liu Xiaoming on 4th April 2011 at the 
Monday  Luncheon  Club,  The  Reform  Club,  London.  Available  on:  http://www.chinese-
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